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 Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison from Paris on 
September 6, 1789 that “no society can make a perpetual 
 constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always 
to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what pro-
ceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.” 1 Jefferson 
expressed the view that, not only should each generation be able 
to choose the laws under which it is governed, but that the power 
of repeal is in no way equal to the power to choose anew: 
 It may be said that the succeeding generation exercising in 
fact the power of repeal, this leaves them as free as if the con-
stitution or law had been expressly limited to 19 years only. 
In the first place, this objection admits the right, in proposing 
an equivalent. But the power of repeal is not an equivalent. 
It might be indeed if every form of government were so per-
fectly contrived that the will of the 
majority could always be obtained 
fairly and without impediment. But 
this is true of no form. The people 
cannot assemble themselves; their 
representation is unequal and vicious. 
Various checks are opposed to every 
legislative proposition. Factions get 
possession of the public councils. 
Bribery corrupts them. Personal inter-
ests lead them astray from the general 
interests of their constituents; and other impediments arise 
so as to prove to every practical man that a law of limited 
duration is much more manageable than one which needs a 
repeal. 2 
 Jefferson understood the difficulty of overcoming entrenched 
interests. And his remark foreshadowed the difficulty of change 
through the processes outlined in the Article V amendment 
clauses—clauses which also prohibit one of the very changes 
critics such as Robert Dahl and Sanford Levinson have been 
advocating, namely, that “no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” 3 Though Jefferson 
was concerned with the conditions necessary to maintain the 
kind of citizens who were capable of self-government, he was 
not afraid of considered political change. 4 
 Sanford Levinson strikes a distinctly Jeffersonian posture in 
 Our Undemocratic Constitution . Realizing the massive difficul-
ties standing in the way of some of the reforms he urges readers 
to consider, he nevertheless provokes a wide audience to ask 
themselves whether the arrangements endorsed in 1787 serve 
Americans well today. I assigned this text to  undergraduates 
at Swarthmore this past fall, and it did, indeed, provoke them 
to think new thoughts and to examine constitutional arrange-
ments anew. Two decades ago, in  Constitutional Faith , Levinson 
asked, “Is there anything built into the definition of law (or, 
more crucially, of the Constitution) that guarantees that it will 
necessarily be  worthy of respect?” 5 Blind veneration is not, 
Levinson argues, the proper basis for respect by citizens in a 
democracy; examination, critical reflection, and an assessment 
of performance in light of current conditions and needs is what 
is necessary. For Levinson, law achieves moral force when 
it stems from willful desire. 6 Levinson would likely second 
John Stuart Mill’s insistence that failure to subject beliefs to 
examination and vigorous defense was unsuitable and even dan-
gerous for enlightened, self-governing 
people. 7 And indeed, Levinson, like 
Mill and his enlightenment forefathers 
that included Jefferson, believes in and 
desires progress in politics. Civilization 
follows upon the heels of barbarism, 
and societies should re-examine and 
cast off old institutions when the old no 
longer serve. 8 If we live in a democratic 
age and the Constitution we inherited is 
insufficiently democratic, then we owe it to ourselves, and pre-
sumably to future generations, to remove constitutional ‘imper-
fections’ and ‘stupidities.’ 
 In this highly accessible reflection,  Our Undemocratic 
Constitution challenges Americans to propose a constitutional 
convention in order to make America more democratic and egali-
tarian. Levinson possesses a real faith that a new constitutional 
convention, if convened, would alter the Constitution in ways he 
would consider more democratic. As a Political Scientist, I need 
to introduce a few cautions. Those who care the most deeply 
about, and have perhaps already mobilized intensively around, 
particular constitutional reforms are the ones most likely to 
invest time and attention in this process. They are likely to have 
built think-tanks and to have cultivated funding sources to wage 
their campaigns. The reforms Levinson advocates need to be 
backed by equally powerful and intense movements. Moreover, 
current arrangements invest certain actors and interests with 
benefits they will likely mobilize to protect, and fear of discrete 
or tangible loss helps mobilize actors far more effectively than 
hope of a more remote or less tangible gain. 9 
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 Might a constitutional convention propose that life begins 
at conception? That gay marriage become unconstitutional, 
 pre-empting the states? Could a convention bar the federal 
government from burdening states with unfunded mandates, or 
require that the federal government balance its annual budgets, 
just as many states are required by law to do? Might it stipulate 
that any regulation negatively impacting the value or anticipated 
revenue from private property constitute a “taking” requiring just 
compensation? Might a convention strip the federal courts of par-
ticular types of jurisdiction, or end the practice of judicial review 
altogether (and should that bother us)? Could the commerce 
clause be redefined in a convention so that the reach of the fed-
eral government under this clause be drastically curtailed? Might 
the doctrine of state sovereignty infuse the 10 th Amendment 
with new force, perhaps simply beginning the Amendment 
“the  powers not expressly delegated to the United States…?” 
Might the delegates to a new convention tighten up the neces-
sary and proper clause along the same lines? Could Americans 
choose to mandate the teaching of creationism in public schools 
or require school prayer? And is it conceivable that the conven-
tion would bar immigration, especially from certain regions, 
ethnicities, or classes? What might result from a constitutional 
convention, absent laborious and long-term mobilization, could 
be frightening for many liberals and progressives, and for others 
who do not think that a mandated devolution of power from the 
national government to the states is appropriate (no matter how 
important local and regional initiatives) in an era of increasing 
globalization and multilateral decision-making. 
 Not all of the proposals suggested in  Our Undemocratic 
Constitution have the same force or weight. They certainly did not 
resonate equally with my students—for instance,  students failed to 
get excited over age and residency requirements. 10 Nevertheless, 
Levinson’s assertions about the ways the Constitution serves to 
impede the development of democracy are highly provocative. 
And he surely makes an important assertion for students of 
American politics: that democratic aspirations meet structural 
impediments in the United States. If there are reasons why the 
Constitution discourages citizens or some groups of citizens 
from feeling invested in the political process, it is a problem for 
advocates of democracy and civic engagement. 
 I want to embellish Levinson’s reflection this way: does the 
Constitution, for one or several reasons, suppress political partic-
ipation and the quality of democratic deliberation in America? If 
so, what can and should be done to change these dynamics? Do 
the changes envisioned require an overhaul of the Constitution? 
While the last question would appear to require an answer in the 
affirmative, it is also possible that current arrangements, inte-
grated in the fabric and tradition of our political system, in fact 
have no sacrosanct constitutional status. Could they then, with 
political will, be reconstructed in some alternate way? 
 I want to focus on the system by which we elect the 
 president—a system that Levinson calls dreadful and 
Byzantine. 11 In 2008, a number of states experienced record 
turnout in caucuses and  primaries, especially Democratic 
turnout. African Americans and young voters turned out in 
November in robust numbers, offsetting a decline among some 
groups of white voters. The upturn in youth voting appeared 
to extend a modest but discernable trend following a lengthy 
decline in political participation of young cohorts. Interest in 
the race was high for reasons extending beyond race. America 
elected the first black president. Predicted debacles did not 
materialize (no Ohio 2004 or Florida 2000). So why worry 
about a system that can work like this? 
 A trip I made to Kazakhstan in October to speak about the 
upcoming American elections occasioned further on our own elec-
toral process. I read a report of complaints about the  transparency 
and accountability of elections in Kazakhstan  leveled by the 
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] 
so that I could think comparatively about  election problems and 
the kinds of issues that might best engage students and activ-
ists there. 12 I also discovered that, in 2004, OSCE observers 
in Florida had said that they had less access to the polls than 
in Kazakhstan. 13 Our processes—for indeed, it would be an 
overstatement even to claim that each state had a single set of 
rules and procedures—discourage many Americans from par-
ticipating. As the OSCE report on the 2004 U.S. election notes, 
with variations even at the county level (ballot design; choice of 
election technology), “there are a significant number of differ-
ent legal regimes determining the manner in which elections are 
conducted.” 14 
 In  Bush v. Gore , the Court asserted that “The individual 
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors 
for the President of the United States unless and until the state 
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to imple-
ment its power to appoint members of the Electoral College.” 15 
Since South Carolina was the last state to accord this privilege 
to voters in 1868, it was surprising to hear the Court’s claim: had 
not the Constitution been informally amended by practice, so 
that states could not withdraw this “right”? The fact that there 
is no federal constitutional right to vote has a variety of other 
ramifications in the American electoral process. There are many 
disparities in the likelihood that one’s vote will count, or even 
in the likelihood that one will even be able to cast a vote. While 
the Voting Rights Act affords federal protection from a number 
of recognizable practices that discriminate on the basis of race 
(or linguistic community), it leaves in place many other kinds of 
intentional and unintentional barriers to effective voting. As the 
2004 OSCE report notes, generally, federal law provides only 
minimal  standards for voter protection and enfranchisement. 
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 The 1993 National Voter Registration Act (Motor Voter) was 
designed to make voter registration easier by mandating that 
registration be available at a variety of federal facilities as well 
as providing for easy enrollment when applicants seek state 
driver’s licenses. The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was 
a  bipartisan federal initiative to address problems highlighted 
by the 2000 election, mandating statewide voter registra-
tion  databases, providing funds for improvements in election 
machinery, and introducing provisional ballots throughout the 
United States, implementation of key provisions left a great 
deal to state discretion. There were far more carrots than sticks. 
And what one hand gave, another sought to take away. Every 
effort to expand access to the franchise seems to mobilize the 
opposition in the name of protecting the integrity of the politi-
cal process. Of course there are partisan motives to such claims, 
because  first-time, low-income, or low-information voters have 
particular (or assumed) characteristics and partisanship. Thus, 
the Justice Department under President Bush embarked on an 
assault on voter fraud, targeting individuals for the first time 
(not just conspiracies). A  New York Times report indicated that, 
in five years, there was virtually no 
evidence of organized efforts to skew 
elections and that of the hundred or so 
prosecutions (mostly of Democrats), 
most involved individuals who misun-
derstood eligibility rules or mistakenly 
filled out multiple registration forms. 
The Justice Department net caught up a 
few ex-felons who mistakenly believed 
they were eligible to vote and a few 
immigrants who filled out proffered 
voter registration forms when renew-
ing their driver’s licenses or who believed that, since they 
had applied for citizenship, they could fill out a registration 
form received in the mail (at least one of these persons was 
deported). 16 Prosecutions and jailings certainly send a message 
that stand to inhibit participation by those who are, indeed, eli-
gible to vote but where misinformation about eligibility (e.g., 
unpaid fines and parking tickets) may prevail. The furor over 
ACORN’s highly mobilized voter registration efforts in 2008, 
resulting in some multiple registrations, masks the fact that 
there are very few known cases of voters trying to cast ballots 
in multiple states. 
 Indiana was one of several states to implement a law requir-
ing a federally or state-issued photo ID for first time voters, 
and the 2005 Indiana statute appears to be the most stringent of 
these laws. Opponents contended that elderly citizens and some 
disabled persons would have trouble obtaining birth certificates 
that would allow them to obtain a free state-issued photo identi-
fication, that many of these same people did not have passports 
or driver’s licenses, and that casting provisional ballots and then 
having to travel to produce the required documentation within 
ten days of the election was a costly burden. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to the Indiana law in 
 Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). 17 Only the 
dissenting justices (Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer) thought that 
the state’s interest in passing such a law (ostensibly vote fraud) 
required some evidence or demonstration when placing such a 
substantial burden on the right to vote. For the Court’s majority, 
in an opinion penned by Justice Stevens, the state’s interest in 
counting only the votes of eligible voters was held to be obvi-
ously legitimate and important. 
 A federally protected right to vote for president might also 
help put an end to state practices of long term felony disenfran-
chisement. Properly articulated, it would help put the federal 
government imprimatur squarely on the side of fairness and 
uniformity. It is not merely the case that convicted felons are 
barred from voting while incarcerated in all but a couple of 
states; in many states, those paroled or on probation are still 
denied the right to vote, and in a significant number of states, 
former offenders remain barred from 
voting for life. As the OSCE notes, it 
is hard to view some of these restric-
tions on the franchise as reasonable 
and proportionate. 18 These ballot 
restriction measures, some of which 
date to the aftermath of the Civil War 
and which again have partisan pur-
poses, were not when instituted and 
are not now race-neutral practices. 
Felon disenfranchisement constitutes 
a kind of civil death that contributes 
to the demobilization, depoliticization, and disempowerment 
of a number of American citizens. We can at least demand 
that these practices be ended for purposes of federal elections. 
Here, in part because of the mention of disenfranchisement in 
connection with crimes in the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Court’s reading of the equal protection clause in the  matter 
of felon disenfranchisement in  Richardson v. Ramirez , we 
 probably will want to amend the Constitution to secure this 
federal protection. 
 Under Article I §4, Congress retains power to make or alter 
the “times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators 
and Representatives,” that are prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof. There would appear to be adequate consti-
tutional authority for Congress to make uniform federal election 
processes and provisions (“except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators,”) extending as well to presidential elections, and yet it 
seems unwilling to do so. We should move to take time, place, 
and manner power from the states in order to make sure that the 
Can simple legislation and currently 
imaginable constitutional amend-
ments help us invigorate democracy 
and enhance democratic delib-
eration as a step in the process of 
change? I believe the generation of 
a federal constitutional right to 
vote is one such imaginable and 
 possible step.
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federal constitutional right to vote is equal, fair, and uniform and 
place this among the powers of Congress. If there is no political 
will, then citizens should join Sandy Levinson in demanding 
a constitutional convention that would articulate this federal 
protection of the right to vote as a component of citizenship in 
the United States, and that would stipulate what a guaranteed 
federal right to vote for president and other federal officials 
should include. 
 A constitutionally protected federal right to vote as a guar-
antee pertaining to U.S. citizenship would prompt federal rules 
under which votes in federal elections are cast, counted, and 
recounted. The federal government could take over administra-
tion of most aspects of federal elections directly. Or, at a mini-
mum, the federal government could hold accountable state actors 
who fail to provide numerous, well-advertised polling places 
with sufficient, adequate and reliable equipment and trained 
poll workers to eliminate multiple hour waits at the polls, and it 
could furthermore insist on uniform rules for voter identifica-
tion, provisional ballots, and early voting. A robust rights-based 
guarantee should lead to more vigorous federal prosecution of 
vote suppression activities, even if they were not aimed at voters 
on the basis of race or language minority group. In crafting lan-
guage for a constitutional revision, it would be wise to make sure 
that nonstate actors who engage in misinformation and suppres-
sion activities would also be subject to federal law. 19 If we came 
to see this right as one worthy of robust federal protection, we 
might more easily make federal election days national holidays 
or experiment with multi-day elections to enhance participation. 
We should be generous in insuring that federal ballot access 
for minor parties is not encumbered (e.g., by rules governing 
nominating petitions). Allowing choice rather than constraining 
it should be a goal of reforms. 
 It is important to recognize that the most significant factors 
depressing voter turnout in the United States are registration-
related barriers to voting. If turnout is calculated among those 
registered to vote, around 86 percent of those registered claim to 
have voted in 2000 and 89 percent in the 2004 election. 20 Even 
accounting for the problem of self-reporting in surveys, it is clear 
that turnout among the registered is robust. It is also clear that a 
good number of would-be voters are turned away from the polls 
because voting lists fail to show their names, and rules for count-
ing of provisional ballots are not necessarily going to solve voter 
list problems. If voters vote in the wrong precinct, or have moved 
close to election time, all bets are off in a system in which deci-
sions about whether to count such votes are decentralized. 21 
 While we are working on equalizing and enhancing partici-
pation in the electoral process, we had better join Levinson in 
proposing elimination of the Electoral College. This institution, 
for which Levinson constructs ‘parade of horribles’ scenarios 
(frightening enough to contemplate) does, indeed, distort the 
way in which votes count, privileging the voices of voters in 
states with smaller populations. In this sense, Levinson, like 
Robert Dahl, is concerned about differential formal weighting of 
votes, and both recognize the insurmountable obstacle to reform 
posed by the Senate. 22 Unlike Dahl, Levinson is also concerned 
with a number of mischiefs that the Electoral College system 
could produce. But the Electoral College has other consequences 
worth considering. It has a tendency to depress or distort voter 
interest and turnout in presidential elections. This should also be 
of concern to those who seek to facilitate democratic aspirations 
through a constitutional convention. 
 Political scientists recognize that citizens are more likely to 
take an interest in presidential elections and to vote when there 
is an active campaign going on where they live. 23 The Electoral 
College system for allocation of the votes that actually matter 
cause many states and congressional districts to be ignored by 
campaigns; either a candidate is sure to win, or sure to lose, that 
state or congressional district. 24 Meanwhile, battleground states 
and specific counties within those states are lavished with atten-
tion from candidates and their surrogates. 25 A relatively small 
number of states are deluged with media buys and campaign 
stops, while others might not know a campaign is going on from 
these indicators. 26 The timing of primaries further privileges 
some voters. While residents of New Hampshire, who ultimately 
wield four electoral votes, are overrun with candidates who visit 
their towns or living rooms during primary season, residents of 
some states have rarely if ever been courted by candidates. 27 Of 
course 2008 was an interesting anomaly for the Democrats; since 
the battle for the nomination extended even beyond the time the 
last primary and caucus votes were cast, candidates campaigned 
heavily in closely contested late primary states, and interest in 
the election among potential Democratic voters remained high. 
In general, areas where candidates are invisible, where campaign 
advertisements do not run, and where the election seems remote, 
participation and electoral turnout are lower. 28 If and when the 
potential electorate is mobilized, interest in issues and in politics 
is higher. 29 Because the existence of the Electoral College shapes 
the strategic behavior of presidential candidates, it also leads to 
selective mobilization of voters and actually demobilizes many 
potential voters. I would argue that its effect is undemocratic in 
this sense as well as the more traditional argument about bean 
counting. 
 Under the current system, there is virtually no incentive to 
mobilize citizens who do not participate, since the object is 
not to maximize overall vote totals for a candidate but rather 
to win the state. Contemporary parties are unlikely to seek to 
mobilize those who do not participate since these nonpartici-
pants do not simply mirror the electorate and they introduce a 
great deal of uncertainty into election outcomes. 30 It could even 
be argued that the Electoral College system gives parties and 
GS 18-1_06.indd   32 7/15/09   5:20:40 PM
S A N F O R D  L E V I N S O N ’ S  O U R  U N D E M O C R A T I C  C O N S T I T U T I O N
Volume 18, Number 1, 2009   33
candidates a disincentive to pay attention to specific interests of 
African Americans or Latinos because they are unlikely, in most 
 elections, to shift the outcome in the state as a whole. 31 And 
George C. Edwards has demonstrated that the interests of small 
states are hardly served by the Electoral College system, since 
candidates who focus on highly competitive states with large 
numbers of electoral votes often neglect small states in their time 
and resource allocation—and also ignore local issues in such 
states. 32 The political conversation might be altered by elimina-
tion of the Electoral College, but there is little if any reason to 
believe it would be altered for the worse. 
 When the Electoral College was created as a  compromise 
mechanism during the final days of the Constitutional Convention, 
it reflected, in part, fears that the populace could not be trusted 
to make good decisions and would not know candidates outside 
their own states or regions. 33 The founders did not invent it 
as a further device to protect state interests, and probably did 
not envision the current system in which all state electors are 
expected to vote as a bloc (another informal amendment to the 
Constitution). As John Roche argues, the framers were prag-
matists and the Electoral College “was merely a jerry-rigged 
improvisation which has subsequently been endowed with a high 
theoretical content….” 34 
 If the Electoral College vanishes, a vote would be a vote 
wherever it were cast throughout the country. Edwards’s exami-
nation of current practices and the manner in which the Electoral 
College shapes these supports Robert Dahl’s claim that “in a sys-
tem of direct election where every citizen’s vote is given equal 
weight, presidential candidates will be even more eager than they 
are now to win votes wherever they might be available; and the 
closer they expect the election to be, the more eagerly they will 
search out those votes.” 35 So long as parties remain reasonably 
competitive on the national level, they will have an incentive to 
campaign vigorously across the country under a system of direct 
election. 
 Conclusion 
 There are a number of other reforms that could enhance 
interest in public affairs and elections and promote civic 
engagement in the United States, but my point has been to 
indicate that a good deal of mileage could likely be obtained 
by these few strategic reforms. And there is considerable pub-
lic support for such changes. The Senate, as Levinson knows, 
is likely to remain the graveyard for these changes, especially 
because of their perceived impact on the interests of smaller 
states. For Levinson, the framers’ intent is not sacrosanct. 
However, what the framers created does function like an iron 
cage with almost kryptonite-like bars. 36 Is the Constitution, 
indeed, paralyzing democracy? 
 Levinson seriously engages the difficulties in calling a new 
constitutional convention to address democratic defects of our 
current Constitution and suggests the possible use of  Fishkin-type 
deliberative polling to build a movement for reform. 37 Based on 
my own experiences with citizen forums, I recognize the value 
of such guided face-to-face discussions. But the exercises also 
underline the point that thoughtful democracy requires a great 
deal of time and investment from citizens. Our political culture 
tends to downplay obligations of citizenship in its overwhelm-
ing emphasis upon individual rights. 38 Moreover, the pace of 
life in the United States at the dawn of the 21 st century seems 
to make time ever more scarce for people ranging from profes-
sionals to workers holding down multiple part-time jobs. These 
tendencies seem to be at war with the considered, careful delib-
eration that is inclusive of all sorts of citizens and interests that 
Levinson’s democratic aspirations are founded upon, and must 
also be addressed in the public sphere. Does my observation 
mean I believe that change is impossible? I would not go so far. 
But the change Levinson wants requires creating new citizens in 
the process—citizens who think and imagine anew. 
 Our Constitution and the informal amendments we live with 
have helped to shape us as citizens. Can simple legislation and 
currently imaginable constitutional amendments help us invigo-
rate democracy and enhance democratic deliberation as a step 
in the process of change? I believe the generation of a federal 
constitutional right to vote is one such imaginable and possible 
step. If we cannot remove the Electoral College by constitutional 
amendment, there are imaginable and possible reforms proposed 
by states, including a proposal originating in Maryland in 2007 
that would bring electoral votes into alignment with the popular 
vote, thereby effectively marginalizing the Electoral College. 39 
If both of these reforms could be made, there is a chance for 
significant payoff for the quantity and quality of democratic 
participation and deliberation in the United States. From there, 
more may well follow. The agenda is modest, but I can indeed 
envision it. We may, like Sanford Levinson, share Jeffersonian 
sensibilities and aspirations, but we are no longer the yeoman 
farmers Jefferson knew. 
 Carol Nackenoff is Richter Professor of Political Science at 
Swarthmore College, where she teaches constitutional law, 
American politics, and environmental politics. Most recently she 
co-edited a volume, Jane Addams and the Practice of Democracy , 
published by the University of Illinois Press. 
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